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The majority of research to date investigating strategic tariﬀs in the presence of
multinationals ﬁnds a knife-edge result where, in equilibrium, all foreign ﬁrms are either
multinationals or exporters. Utilizing a model of heterogeneous ﬁrms, we ﬁnd equilibria
in which both pure exporters and multinationals coexist. We utilize this model to study
the case of endogenously chosen tariﬀs. As is standard, Nash equilibrium tariﬀs are
higher than the socially optimal tariﬀs. Unlike existing models with homogeneous
ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that non-cooperative tariﬀs promote the existence of low-productivity
ﬁrms relative to the socially optimal tariﬀs. This highlights a new source of ineﬃciency
from tariﬀ competition not found in models of homogeneous ﬁrms. In addition, we ﬁnd
that in many cases the Nash equilibrium tariﬀ when FDI is a potential ﬁrm structure
is lower than when it is not. As a result, FDI improves welfare by mitigating tariﬀ
competition.
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11 Introduction
The optimal tariﬀ literature stems as far back as Bickerdike (1906), which links a country’s
ability to increase welfare through a tariﬀ to the elasticity of the foreign export supply.
With the rise of foreign direct investment (FDI), recent literature has begun to examine
the interaction between FDI and tariﬀs. One such interaction is through what has been
coined “tariﬀ-jumping”, which refers to a foreign ﬁrm investing (either through greenﬁeld
FDI or ﬁrm acquisition) in the host country to avoid protectionist barriers. There are two
primary hypotheses for the motivation behind tariﬀ-jumping; one anticipatory and the other
reactional. The former is where a ﬁrm uses FDI as a quid pro quo for a lower future threat
of protection and was formally introduced by Bhagwati (1987).1 The latter, and what will
be focused on here, is where a ﬁrm ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to operate a foreign subsidiary
in a host country in response to erected trade barriers by the importing country. In this
paper we oﬀer the ﬁrst model of endogenously chosen tariﬀs where heterogeneous ﬁrms can
choose between exporting and FDI as a foreign market entry mode using a formulation of
the Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) model. A key consequence of ﬁrm heterogeneity is
that in equilibrium, unilaterally chosen tariﬀs result in lower average ﬁrm productivity than
found at the social planner’s optimal tariﬀs. This highlights a new ineﬃciency resulting from
tariﬀ competition, one that does not exist in models with homogeneous ﬁrms. Furthermore,
in many cases, when FDI is ruled out as a possible ﬁrm structure, these ineﬃciencies become
larger. Therefore, allowing FDI improves welfare by its ability to mitigate tariﬀ competition.
Ellingsen and W¨ arneryd (1999) (EW) are the ﬁrst to analyze the preferred level of pro-
tection in the presence of (or threat of) tariﬀ-jumping. They ﬁnd that domestic ﬁrms would
prefer a tariﬀ just low enough to keep multinationals out of a host country. On the one
1 Blonigen and Feenstra (1997) ﬁnd that the threat of protection had a substantial positive eﬀect on
greenﬁeld FDI in the U.S. in the 1980s, but the protection variable used is a dummy variable taking on only
values of zero and one. Similarly, Blonigen and Figlio (1998) investigate the eﬀect of FDI on U.S. legislators’
votes on protectionist policies between 1985 and 1994 and ﬁnds that quid pro quo FDI has an eﬀect, but
not in a systematic way. For instance, legislators who were initially more protectionist in nature tended to
increase trade restrictions, where legislators who took a more free trade stance were inclined to lower trade
restrictions.
2hand, this result is useful in that it illustrates how domestic ﬁrms, contrary to intuition, do
not want full protection. On the other hand, it provides a knife-edge result in which there
is no FDI in equilibrium; i.e. there is no occurrence of tariﬀ-jumping.2 Ludema (2002), who
considers preferential trade agreements in an economic geography model where an exoge-
nous number of ﬁrms choose FDI to avoid both tariﬀs and transport costs, also ﬁnds this
knife-edge result for multinationals. However, this does not coincide with what is seen in the
real world, where in many industries there are both multinational and exporting ﬁrms (see
Halland and Wooton (1998), Blonigen and Ohno (1998), and Blonigen (2002)). This knife-
edge result is a side-eﬀect of assuming ﬁrms are homogeneous – an assumption abolished in
our model.3
An alternative approach to that of EW is taken by Blanchard (2006, 2007) which assumes
exogenous levels of FDI, eliminating the knife-edge.4 However, Blanchard (2006, 2007) elim-
inates the endogenous choice of FDI and, thus, the tariﬀ-jumping consideration is absent.
The cost of this assumption is not minor, as ignoring endogenous ﬁrm structure eliminates
a major focus of the recent trade literature, an issue which is central to the work on hetero-
geneous ﬁrms. In contrast, our modeling of ﬁrm heterogeneity dulls the knife-edge result of
EW, while still allowing for endogenous ﬁrm entry. Larch (2008) also considers endogenous
FDI, however, he assumes an exogenously endowed speciﬁc factor used by exporters and
multinationals that pins down the mass of varieties. Therefore in his model the mass of
varieties is invariant to the tariﬀ, a structure which, although simplifying enough to yield
tractability, eliminates one of the primary gains from trade in the New Trade theory – an
2EW does characterize an equilibrium with FDI under uncertainty.
3 Another departure from EW is the social welfare function we use. EW cite the literature on the political
economy of protection, such as Hillman (1989) and Rodrik (1995), and utilize a welfare function that reﬂects
the preferences of small, but strong, interest groups – hence they maximize domestic ﬁrm proﬁts. Blonigen,
Tomlin, and Wilson (2004) empirically investigate the eﬀect of U.S. antidumping decisions on domestic ﬁrm
proﬁts and ﬁnd that when tariﬀ-jumping FDI occurs, the proﬁt gains from the trade barrier are at least
partially mitigated. Though domestic ﬁrm proﬁts are an important welfare consideration (particularly in a
political economy framework), we take a more classical approach and treat proﬁts as a source of income for
a representative consumer and the indirect utility of which policy makers seek to maximize.
4Technically, FDI in Blanchard (2006) is modeled as passive claims on foreign output and not majority
ownership of a ﬁrm. However, given the perfect competition assumption of her model, the two deﬁnitions
can be interpreted identically.
3increase in the mass of varieties. Further, in his model, unlike ours, all ﬁrms are either
exporters or multinationals.
Since Melitz (2003) and Jean (2002), a great deal of attention has been given to introduc-
ing ﬁrms that diﬀer in terms of productivity into trade models. Typically in these models,
trade restrictions are exogenously given symmetric iceberg transport costs and little is done
with regards to optimal trade policy. To our knowledge, no one has studied optimal tariﬀs
in the presence of both heterogeneous ﬁrms and the endogenous choice to become a multi-
national. While Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) provide a model with heterogeneous
ﬁrms and the option to become a multinational, their focus is not on optimal trade policy.
Instead they focus on industry composition and productivity as a result of symmetric trade
restrictions (modeled by iceberg transport costs). Jørgensen and Schr¨ oder (2006) investigate
the welfare eﬀects of a tariﬀ in a Melitz (2003) type model. However in their model, tariﬀs
are symmetric and exogenous. Though their model describes some interesting welfare eﬀects,
it does not characterize the unilateral strategy of a particular country and therefore cannot
discuss the welfare implications of tariﬀ competition. Demidova and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2007)
use a Melitz-type model and a small country assumption to show the ﬁrst best outcome can
be achieved through either a consumption subsidy, export tax, or an import tariﬀ. Never-
theless, neither Jørgensen and Schr¨ oder (2006) nor Demidova and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2007)
allow for the possibility of FDI.
It is interesting that there is such limited theoretical work on optimal trade policy in
which both exporters and multinationals are present in equilibrium, given the empirical
evidence of its existence. Exceptions to this include Blonigen and Ohno (1998), who provide
a partial equilibrium Cournot model where ﬁrms have diﬀering (expected) costs of FDI.
In this model, foreign ﬁrms who establish a signiﬁcant production presence try to increase
trade barriers in the home country. The authors provide case studies of U.S. antidumping
cases in tapered roller bearings and color picture tubes and the escape clause investigation of
Japanese autos for empirical evidence. Nevertheless, ﬁlling this gap in the theory is critical
4as it lays the necessary foundation for studying noncooperative trade policy, the formulation
of trade agreements, and the many impacts of international trade policy.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, as noted above, we provide
the ﬁrst model incorporating both ﬁrm heterogeneity and endogenously arising FDI into
the optimal tariﬀ decision. Second, we show that the world welfare maximizing tariﬀ is
negative, that is, welfare is highest when trade is subsidized. This is entirely a consequence
of ﬁrm heterogeneity. As is well known in this class of models, when domestic ﬁrms are
forced to compete with importers the least productive domestic ﬁrms exit. This shifts
resources towards more productive ﬁrms. As a result, at free trade the productivity beneﬁts
of additional competition outweigh the costs arising from the distortions in the relative
price of imported versus domestically produced goods. Third, we characterize the Nash
equilibrium tariﬀs. Regardless of whether FDI is permitted as a possible ﬁrm structure,
we ﬁnd that the Nash tariﬀs are greater than the world welfare maximizing tariﬀs. This
implies that tariﬀ competition lowers average productivity and highlights a new ineﬃciency
from tariﬀ competition, one which arises only in a model of heterogeneity.5 Finally, we use
numerical examples to compare the Nash tariﬀs when FDI is an option for ﬁrms and when
it is not. We ﬁnd that equilibrium tariﬀs are lower whenever ﬁrms avail themselves of FDI.
As a result, FDI mitigates tariﬀ competition and raises Nash equilibrium welfare.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the model and characterizes the equi-
librium. Section 3 derives the world welfare maximizing tariﬀs. Section 4 characterizes the
noncooperative Nash tariﬀ set by a country both with and without multinationals. Section
5 contains a comparison of the Nash tariﬀs and the resulting world welfare both with and
without multinationals. Section 6 concludes.
5This is similar to the model of Davies and Eckel (forthcoming) in which governments compete in proﬁt
taxes for mobile heterogeneous ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that tax competition often results in non-harmonized taxes
which then encourages survival of low-productivity ﬁrms.
52 The Model
There are two countries labeled ? and ?.6 Country ? (?) is endowed with ¯ 𝐿? (¯ 𝐿?) units of labor
which is the sole factor of production. Without loss of generality, let ¯ 𝐿? ≥ ¯ 𝐿?. There are two
sectors. Sector 1 is the numeraire and consists of a homogeneous good (𝑦) that is produced
under constant returns to scale, freely traded, and sold in a perfectly competitive market.
Sector 2 consists of a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods, each variety of which is indexed by
?. As is standard in the Melitz model, this is produced under increasing returns to scale in a
monopolistically competitive market with free entry. Unlike sector 1, this market may face
tariﬀ barriers. With the exception of the diﬀering labor endowments and (potentially) tariﬀ
rates, countries are identical. Therefore, analyzing the situation for country ? informs us of
the analogous situation for country ?, and we will refer to country ? as the domestic country
to ease discussion.
The timing of the model is as follows. In stage 1, tariﬀs are simultaneously set. In
stage 2, ﬁrms choose whether or not to serve the domestic market and whether to serve the
overseas market through FDI (if it is an option), exporting, or not at all. Finally, in stage
3, production takes place, trading commences, and payoﬀs are realized. We solve for the
equilibrium via subgame perfection.
2.1 Sector 1
The price of 𝑦 is normalized to 1 in each market. Assuming that one unit of labor is needed
for production, this normalizes the wage in each country to unity. Finally, we assume that
in equilibrium a positive amount of 𝑦 is produced in each country.
6Since the amount of foreign ﬁrms active in a country depends only on that country’s tariﬀ, expanding our
model to include additional countries would expand the interpretation of the mass of foreign exporters and
multinationals. While this might aﬀect the margins for optimal tariﬀ setting, it would not qualitatively aﬀect
the results. Furthermore, if a country can set diﬀerent tariﬀs on diﬀerent countries’ ﬁrms the equilibrium
between any two countries would be identical to that found here.
62.2 Consumers
The representative consumer in country ? has quasi-linear preferences embedded with a
Dixit-Stiglitz utility function which displays love for variety over the heterogeneous good:







, 𝜇 > 0 (1)
where 𝜀 = 1/(1 − 𝗼) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution, 𝑁? is the total mass of varieties in
country ?, 𝑌? denotes aggregate consumption of the numeraire, and 𝑋? can be interpreted
as the amount of a composite good comprised of the diﬀerent varieties of the heterogeneous
goods 𝑥?(?). Consumers maximize utility subject to their budget constraint:
∫ 𝑁𝑘
0
𝑝?(?)𝑥?(?)𝑑? + 𝑌? ≤ 𝐼? (2)
where 𝑝?(?) is the price of variety ? and 𝐼? is aggregate income in country ?. We assume that
income in each country is suﬃciently large that both goods are consumed. The solution to






Since preferences are identical across both countries, it follows that the total expenditure on
the heterogeneous good is equal to 𝜇 in both foreign and domestic markets.
2.3 Heterogeneous Firms
There is a continuum of ﬁrms, each of which holds a unique position on an index, where each
point ? represents a unique variety and productivity level.7, 8 Armed with this index the ﬁrm
7One interpretation of the model is that ﬁrms are owned by entrepreneurs and that ﬁrm proﬁts accrue
to these entrepreneurs. In our representative agent setting, these proﬁts would simply enter national income
in the same way that wages do, therefore we discuss the model in terms of ﬁrms to avoid needless jargon.
8It is common in heterogeneous ﬁrm models to have entrepreneurs draw from a distribution of produc-
tivities (often at a cost). The advantage to that approach is that it permits multiple varieties to have the
7decides whether to serve the domestic market and/or the overseas market. To serve a given
market, the ﬁrm must incur a ﬁxed cost. These costs are referred to as ‘beachhead’ costs and
can be interpreted as forming a distribution and servicing network.9 To serve its domestic
market, a ﬁrm with index ? must hire 𝑓(?) units of labor (making the ﬁxed cost of serving
this market 𝑓(?)). If a ﬁrm chooses to serve the foreign market, it can do so through exports
and pay an extra 𝗾𝑓(?) or become a multinational and pay an extra Γ𝑓(?). We assume that
Γ > 𝗾 > 1; 𝑓′(?) > 0 and 𝑓′′(?) ≥ 0, i.e. the mapping from the index to the labor required for
beachhead costs is increasing and convex in the index. Thus, ﬁrms requiring fewer workers
to cover beachhead costs have a lower index ?. These ﬁxed cost diﬀerences are the source of
ﬁrm heterogeneity. A ﬁrm, therefore, faces the following menu of ﬁxed costs (measured in
units of labor):
Table 1: Fixed Cost Menu
Firm Type Fixed Cost
domestic only 𝑓(?)
domestic and exporter (1 + 𝗾)𝑓(?)
domestic and multinational (1 + Γ)𝑓(?)
Production exhibits constant returns to scale with labor as the only factor of production.
The unit-labor requirement for a ﬁrm is normalized to one. Note that given this, ﬁrms with
a low ? require less labor per unit of output. We therefore describe these ﬁrms as relatively
more productive ﬁrms.
Goods that are exported from country ? to country ? are subject to an ad valorem tariﬀ
𝜏?, where we deﬁne 𝑡? ≡ 1 + 𝜏?. We assume that a government is unable to distinguish
same productivity. The cost, however, is one of added complexity and additional assumptions since modelers
are often forced to parameterize this distribution (the Pareto distribution is a common choice). Here, our
assumption of unique variety/productivity combinations aids greatly in the presentation of our results in
the simplest, most tractable fashion. Nevertheless, were we to pursue the alternative approach, the intuition
of our results would remain: that welfare is maximized through trade subsidies, tariﬀ competition leads to
excessively high tariﬀs and lower average productivity, and FDI can beneﬁt welfare by mitigating tariﬀ com-
petition. See Cole (2008) and Jørgensen and Shr¨ oder (2009) for a detailed comparison between our current
setup and the more traditional approach.
9The term ‘beachhead’ costs was coined by Baldwin (1988).
8a particular ﬁrm’s type, so any tariﬀ is an across-the-board tariﬀ applied to all foreign
exporters. Intuitively, this is akin to a country charging the same tariﬀ on all imported
automobiles and not diﬀerent tariﬀs on speciﬁc makes and models.
The decision to become a ﬁrm and which market to service depends on the associated
proﬁt for each type. Recall that the numeraire yields wages equal to one in both countries,
thus the operating proﬁts from serving the domestic market in country ? are
𝜋
?
?(?) = 𝑝?(?)𝑞?(?) − 𝑞?(?) − 𝑓(?). (4)
Given the nature of monopolistic competition, the price will be a constant mark-up over
marginal cost and be equal to 1
𝗼. From market clearing, set 𝑞?(?) = 𝑥?(?), and the ﬁrm has
the following proﬁt function for supplying to the domestic market only:
𝜋
?



















is the aggregate price index of the heterogeneous
good.10 This can also be interpreted as the price of one unit of the composite good 𝑋?.
Recall that 𝑁? is the total mass of all varieties in country ?, domestic and foreign; with the
latter including imported varieties and locally produced varieties through FDI. Thus, the
decision for foreign ﬁrms to enter the market (either through exports or FDI) aﬀects the
aggregate price index which, in turn, aﬀects a domestic ﬁrm’s variable proﬁt (represented
by 𝐵?). This price index eﬀect can be more readily seen by fully writing out 𝑃?:
10Recall 𝜀 = 1





























??? + ??𝑀 + 𝑡
1−𝜀
? (??𝑋 − ??𝑀)
]
where ???, ??𝑀, and ??𝑋 are the mass of domestic ﬁrms, foreign multinationals, and foreign
exporters respectively.11 These terms will be discussed in greater detail in the following
section.
When serving the foreign market the ﬁrm can do so by exporting or through FDI. The










𝑀(?) = 𝐵? − Γ𝑓(?). (7)
Note that since expenditure on the diﬀerentiated good is the same in each country (and
equal to 𝜇), Γ > 𝗾 > 1 is suﬃcient to guarantee that a ﬁrm serving the foreign market (either
through exports or FDI) will also serve the domestic market. In addition, the variable proﬁt
of a multinational is identical to that of a domestic ﬁrm in country ?. The variable proﬁt
of an exporter is lower (as long as there exists a positive tariﬀ), but the ﬁxed cost is also
lower. The diﬀerence in variable proﬁts between the two methods of serving the foreign
market is the driving force behind the decision to become a multinational. As the tariﬀ
rate increases, the variable proﬁt of an exporter decreases while the diﬀerences in ﬁxed cost
remain the same. When the tariﬀ rate is suﬃciently high, the gain from higher variable
proﬁt is greater than the higher ﬁxed cost of becoming a multinational, and a ﬁrm chooses
FDI over exporting. This is then an example of the well known proximity-concentration
11In this equation we see the simplicity which our assumption of unique variety/productivity pairs buys
us. Note that one method of obtaining this simple formulation of 𝑃𝑘 using the traditional approach would
be to assume that 𝑖 is distributed uniform on the interval [0,1].
10tradeoﬀ, evidence of which is shown by Brainard (1997) among others.12
2.4 Equilibrium for given tariﬀs
Firms will enter each market as long as the associated proﬁts are greater than the opportunity
cost, that is, as long as the expressions in (5) and (6) are greater than zero. Furthermore,
a ﬁrm will choose to be a multinational as long as the proﬁt in equation (7) is greater than
that in equation (6). We deﬁne the cutoﬀ ﬁrms as the ﬁrms whose index solves the following
conditions:

















?ℎ? + ?𝑔𝑀 + 𝑡
1−𝜀
ℎ (?𝑔𝑋 − ?𝑔𝑀)
]
for ℎ = ?,? and 𝑔 ∕= ℎ. The index ?ℎ? represents the ﬁrm that is indiﬀerent between
producing the diﬀerentiated good and not producing at all (i.e. the least productive domestic
producer). The least productive exporting ﬁrm is denoted by ?𝑔𝑋, and ?𝑔𝑀 is the ﬁrm that is
indiﬀerent between serving the foreign market through exports or FDI. Figure 1 illustrates
these relative cutoﬀs by plotting the ﬁrm’s proﬁt as a function of its index.13
12It is worth noting that the model in Brainard suﬀers from precisely the knife-edge problem that our
approach resolves.
13Note that in Figure 1 the linearity of proﬁts in 𝑖 stems from the assumption that 𝑓(𝑖) = 𝜂𝑖+𝜆. We will













FDI Exporting Domestic sales only No entry
Figure 1: Firm proﬁt as a function of the index ?
To derive how the cutoﬀs move with changes in the tariﬀ, we totally diﬀerentiate the





























































From (12) and (13) (which we can sign regardless of the sign of (14)), we see that a rise in
the tariﬀ leads the most productive foreign exporters to become multinationals and the least
productive foreign exporters to exit the domestic market entirely. What eﬀect this has on
the domestic price index and therefore the mass of domestic ﬁrms depends on the how these







































This last term relates the increase in domestic competition from additional multinationals
to the reduction in competition as low-productivity foreign exporters leave. In order to sign





where 𝗿(?) is the elasticity of 𝑓(?) with respect to ?. Thus, this assumption requires that the
elasticity of the ﬁxed cost mapping is not too increasing in the index when evaluated at the
relevant cutoﬀs.14 Using the equilibrium conditions (9) and (10) and our assumption on the
















− 𝗼(?𝑔𝑋 − ?𝑔𝑀)
]
< 0. (18)
This then implies that as the tariﬀ rises, 𝑃ℎ falls, increasing the aggregate price index
and the cutoﬀ for the last domestic ﬁrm. Thus, trade protection has the intuitive eﬀect of
increasing domestic output. These results are qualitatively identical to those of other similar
models in the heterogeneous ﬁrm literature, such as Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and
Yeaple (2004). Where this paper diﬀers and makes its main contribution is by characterizing
world welfare maximizing tariﬀs and countries’ noncooperative Nash tariﬀs. This is the goal
14Note that this is weaker than assuming that 𝗿(𝑖) is not too increasing in all 𝑖. Further, note that this
is a suﬃcient, not a necessary condition for (18) to hold. In many of the numerical examples used in the
paper, we assume that 𝑓(𝑖) = 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜆, a function where 𝗿(𝑖) is increasing in 𝑖, but not so much as to violate
this condition. Another obvious candidate for 𝑓(𝑖) which fulﬁlls this assumption is any constant elasticity
function.
13of the next sections.
Before doing so, however, it is important to note that there is nothing that ensures there
will always be positive mass of multinationals. The presence of multinationals depends on
both the tariﬀ level and the ﬁxed cost mapping since ﬁrms will only choose FDI when the
savings from avoiding the tariﬀ are at least as great as the additional ﬁxed costs from setting
up a subsidiary. Utilizing a speciﬁc parameterization of the ﬁxed cost mapping, such as
𝑓(?) = 𝜂? + 𝜆, we can illustrate this graphically. In this example, the most productive ﬁrm







𝐵ℎ < 𝜆. (19)
In Figure 2, we illustrate for country ? the pairs (𝜆,𝜏?) for which the most productive
exporting ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between becoming a multinational and staying an exporter (i.e.
when (19) holds with equality). For future reference, we refer to these pairs of tariﬀs and 𝜆
as the 𝐹𝐹 line.
2.5 Welfare
The indirect utility of the representative consumer, and our measure of national welfare, is
𝑉? = 𝜇ln(𝑋?) + 𝐼? − 𝜇. (20)
For a given tariﬀ, income is equal to labor income plus proﬁts from domestically owned ﬁrms
and tariﬀ revenue:15






































Figure 2: Minimum Tariﬀ Needed to Induce FDI
The term 𝐶?𝑋 represents country ?’s aggregate consumption of imported varieties of the dif-
ferentiated good. For future reference we analogously deﬁne 𝐶?? as ?’s aggregate consump-
tion of the domestically produced varieties of the diﬀerentiated good which are produced by
domestic ﬁrms and 𝐶?𝑀 as ?’s aggregate consumption of the varieties produced domestically
by ?’s multinational ﬁrms.
3 Social Planner’s Problem
In this section, we solve for the world welfare maximizing tariﬀs (which we refer to as the
socially optimal tariﬀs as chosen by a social planner).16 Noting the analogous nature of the
equilibrium across countries, we focus on the socially optimal tariﬀ for country ? since a
comparable result is found for country ?’s socially optimal tariﬀ. In doing so, we assume
that the social planner puts equal weight on the welfare of each country. The ﬁrst order
16Note that this social optimum is an optimum under the constraint that no ﬁrm can be forced to accept
negative proﬁts, as discussed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).





















      
= 0 (21)
(−) (?)
where 𝜎?𝑋 is the price elasticity of import demand in country ?. From here, we can show that
the social planner’s preferred tariﬀ is negative, i.e. world welfare is maximized by subsidizing
trade.
Proposition 1. Whether or not multinationals are present, the optimal tariﬀ for the social
planner is a subsidy.
Proof. Although it is tempting to simply evaluate (21) at 𝜏? = 0, without pinning down the
magnitude of 𝜎?𝑋, we cannot rule out multiple solutions. Further, the magnitude of 𝜎?𝑋
is contingent on the presence of FDI. Thus to ﬁnd the global maximum it is necessary to
consider both the case where FDI occurs and where it does not. If FDI is not present (either
























      
< −1
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If FDI is present, then:
𝜎?𝑋 =
𝑡?
??? + ??𝑀 + 𝑡
1−𝜀
















𝜀(??? + ??𝑀) + 𝑡
1−𝜀
? (??𝑋 − ??𝑀)
??? + ??𝑀 + 𝑡
1−𝜀
? (??𝑋 − ??𝑀)
< −1
17See the appendix for a more thorough derivation.






∂𝜏𝑘 > 0. Thus, regardless of the presence of FDI,
the import demand in country ? is elastic. It then follows that the ﬁnal bracket in (21) is
negative, implying that for the ﬁrst order condition to hold 𝜏? < 0 at the social optimum.
Furthermore, since country size does not impact the social planner’s ﬁrst order condition,
we ﬁnd the same result for 𝜏?.
There are two interesting features of this result to point out. First, unlike most models
of tariﬀ setting, the social optimum is not free trade. This results from heterogeneity in ﬁrm
productivity. In this setting, as found in other models of heterogeneity such as Melitz (2003),
competition with foreign ﬁrms leads the least productive domestic ﬁrms to exit the market, a
move which shifts resources towards more productive uses. When trade barriers are a choice
variable, something not discussed by Melitz, on the margin this productivity boost gives the
social planner an additional incentive to promote trade. Thus, world welfare improves by
subsidizing imports since this drives out the least productive ﬁrms, a change that more than
oﬀsets consumption distortions caused by non-zero tariﬀs. This result would not arise in
a model with homogeneous ﬁrms. Second, since tariﬀs are negative, multinationals do not
occur at the social planner’s optimum. Without transport costs, both ﬁrms and the social
planner prefer that overseas markets are served through exports rather than FDI since FDI
carries a greater ﬁxed cost with no beneﬁts. Since there are no spillovers from FDI in our
model, the social planner is content to allow this entry mode to go unutilized. If features such
as physical trade costs or productivity spillovers from FDI were introduced into the model,
they would provide an incentive for the social planner to not drive out FDI in equilibrium.18
Nevertheless, these beneﬁts would have to be balanced against the productivity gains from
trade promotion that form the driving force in our model. Therefore, in the interest of
simplicity we do not consider them here.
18Evidence of such productivity spillovers are provided by Javorcik (2004). Chor (2009) considers optimal
FDI subsidies when heterogeneous ﬁrms face transport costs.
174 Nash Tariﬀ
In this section, we derive the Nash equilibrium in which countries unilaterally choose their
tariﬀs. When country ? charges a tariﬀ, there are two standard income eﬀects. The ﬁrst is an
increase in tariﬀ revenue, the second is increased domestic proﬁt from reduced competition.
However, as in Larch (2008), there is no terms of trade beneﬁt. This is for two reasons. First,
since higher tariﬀ prices are a ﬁxed markup over a constant wage, pre-tariﬀ import prices
do not change. Second, quasi-linear utility pushes domestic and overseas income changes
onto the numeraire. This leaves overseas consumption of the heterogeneous good, and thus
proﬁts from ?’s exporters or multinationals, unaﬀected by ?’s tariﬀ. Note that this means
any tariﬀ set by country ? will not aﬀect the tariﬀ setting decision of country ?, resulting in
dominant strategies.


























∂𝜏?       
= 0. (22)
The ﬁrst underbrace represents the eﬀect of a tariﬀ on consumers by aﬀecting the total
amount of the heterogeneous good they consume. The latter two underbraces represent
income changes. More speciﬁcally, the second underbrace is the eﬀect of a tariﬀ on the
proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms producing the heterogeneous good. Finally, the third underbrace is














Our next proposition compares this result with that for the social planner.
19See the appendix for detailed derivation and note the comparability of the problems choosing the uni-
laterally optimal tariﬀ and the world welfare maximizing one.
18Proposition 2. Regardless of whether multinationals are present in equilibrium, Nash tariﬀs
are higher than the world welfare maximizing tariﬀs.
Proof. Comparing (23) with the social planner’s ﬁrst order condition (21), the diﬀerence is
driven by the eﬀect of country ?’s tariﬀ on country ?. Regardless of whether multinationals
are present, country ?’s total exporter proﬁts are decreasing in 𝜏?. This is clear from two
facts. First, a rise in ?’s tariﬀ leads to a decline in ?’s exporter cutoﬀ since variable proﬁts
are falling in the tariﬀ. Since all of ?’s exporters earn the same variable proﬁt, this results
in a smaller mass of ﬁrms earning less each. Country ? does not consider this when setting
its unilaterally optimal tariﬀ. Therefore, at the tariﬀ which solves (21), (23) is positive,
implying that ? will set a tariﬀ higher than what the social planner would choose (which by
Proposition 1 is negative). Further, if ? sets a tariﬀ such that FDI occurs, this requires that
𝜏? > 0. Therefore regardless of whether FDI arises in the Nash equilibrium or not, Nash
tariﬀs are greater than the world welfare maximizing tariﬀs.
Note that this proposition does not require that FDI occurs in the Nash equilibrium.
Evaluating (23) at 𝜏? = 0, the ﬁnal term drops out and we are left with a negative eﬀect
(the ﬁrst term, representing changes in productivity and the mass of varieties with respect to
tariﬀ changes) and a positive eﬀect (the second term, representing marginal tariﬀ revenues).
Unlike the social planner’s case, where tariﬀ revenues for one country were canceled out by
tariﬀ payments by the other, this second term remains in the unilateral case. Therefore, it is
in general ambiguous whether the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the unilateral tariﬀ as in the social
planner’s problem or not.
For qualitative results, we turn to the illustrative example where 𝑓(?) = 𝜂?+𝜆 and focus
on two main parameters: the elasticity of substitution (𝜀) and 𝜆 (which is inversely related
to 𝗿(?), the elasticity of 𝑓(?) with respect to ?). In Figure 3, we graph a country’s Nash
tariﬀ as a function of the elasticity of substitution. It can be seen that for low values of
19𝜀, the Nash tariﬀ is a subsidy.20 As the elasticity of substitution increases, the Nash tariﬀ
increases as well up to a point and then decreases but stays positive. When 𝜀 is small, the
ﬁrm’s price markup is higher and, ceteris paribus, there are more ﬁrms in equilibrium. As
a result, encouraging imports creates a large beneﬁt by greatly shifting resources from low
productivity domestic ﬁrms to high productivity ones. As 𝜀 increases, the mass of domestic
ﬁrms declines, reducing this beneﬁt relative to the tariﬀ’s revenue generating properties
resulting in a positive tariﬀ. Finally, as 𝜀 grows very large, the market approaches perfect
competition and foreign exporters become very sensitive to tariﬀs, resulting in a Nash tariﬀ
that asymptotically approaches zero from above.













Figure 3: Optimal Tariﬀ as a function of 𝜀
The ﬁnding that there exist parameter values resulting in unilateral Nash subsidies is
somewhat unusual in the literature. Helpman and Krugman (1989) describe a similar model
with monopolistic competition and quasi-linear utility yet ﬁnd a small across-the-board tar-
20Since we are focusing here on the case of negative Nash tariﬀs, where FDI does not occur, in Figure 3
we set Γ suﬃciently high so this is the case to simplify graphical presentation.
20iﬀ increases unilateral welfare.21 In addition, Broda, Lim˜ ao, and Weinstein (2006) use a
similar model and ﬁnd that this small across-the-board tariﬀ equals the standard inverse of
export supply elasticity.22 However, both of these models assume homogeneous ﬁrms and
therefore do not have the productivity enhancing eﬀect of a subsidy that our heterogeneous
ﬁrms model provides. Demidova and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2007) provide a model with ﬁrm-level
heterogeneity and ﬁnd a positive tariﬀ is optimal. Their model, however, does not have a
numeraire and wages are a function of tariﬀs. As a result, a small positive tariﬀ increases
the local wage and more than oﬀsets any productivity gain from a subsidy. Another factor
complicating comparisons between their results and ours is that in our model, depending on
𝑓(?), even a small tariﬀ can induce FDI, a feature absent from their exporter-only model.
One paper that does ﬁnd a result comparable to ours is Chor (2009) who discusses parame-
terizations of his model where a country unilaterally implements an import subsidy.23 Note
that he does not, however, consider tariﬀ competition or world welfare maximizing tariﬀs.
Turning to the ﬁxed cost function, Figure 4 shows the relationship between the Nash
tariﬀ and 𝜆 for two cases, one where FDI is an option for ﬁrms and one where it is not. In
the no FDI case, the Nash tariﬀ is falling in 𝜆. The reason for this can be traced to the
tariﬀ’s revenue generating capabilities. As 𝜆 rises, low productivity foreign exporters quit
the domestic market. This lowers the tax base for the tariﬀ, reducing its marginal beneﬁt
and its equilibrium value. When FDI is an option for ﬁrms, we see two changes. First, the
level of the tariﬀ is lower. This is because the gain from implementing the tariﬀ is smaller due
to tariﬀ-jumping multinationals who reduce the tax base (we discuss this in greater detail
in the next section). Second, the Nash tariﬀ is increasing in 𝜆. As in the no FDI case, an
increase in 𝜆 drives low productivity foreign exporters out of the domestic market. However,
when FDI is present, it also leads low productivity multinationals to switch to exporting
21Their model is a speciﬁc example of the more general model described in Flam and Helpman (1987).
22Their model is an adaptation of Broda and Weinstein (2006).
23Unlike our setting, due to transport costs, even in this case FDI occurs in his model. In addition,
since Chor ﬁnds this result in a model of heterogeneous unit labor requirements, it reinforces the general
applicability of our results.
21because the ﬁxed cost savings of doing so are now greater. In this parameterization of the
model, the net eﬀect of these is to increase the tax base, which increases the incentive to
implement a tariﬀ.
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Figure 4: Optimal Tariﬀ as a function of 𝜆 (with 𝜀 = 3.33)
Figure 4 also serves to illustrate the corner solutions that can arise in a country’s choice
of Nash tariﬀ which follows the bold line. For low 𝜆, the unilaterally optimal tariﬀ lies above
the FF line, i.e. FDI will occur in equilibrium. For high 𝜆, the reverse is true. In the middle
range, however, a corner solution is found. At the point where the Nash tariﬀ line with
FDI intersects the FF line, no FDI occurs in equilibrium. However, the threat of FDI stops
the government from implementing the tariﬀ it would choose were FDI not an option at all
(i.e. the one on the Nash tariﬀ without FDI line). Thus, similar to Ellingsen and W¨ arneryd
(1999), the mere threat of FDI can have an eﬀect on a country’s tariﬀ.
225 To FDI or not to FDI
In the previous section we found that regardless of whether FDI occurs in equilibrium, Nash
tariﬀs are ineﬃciently high relative to the world welfare maximizing tariﬀs. In addition, as
illustrated in Figure 4, equilibrium tariﬀs can diﬀer. Furthermore, even for given tariﬀs,
since multinationals charge diﬀerent prices than exporters, one would expect this to have
an impact on the equilibrium mass of exporters and domestic ﬁrms. In this section we
investigate this more deeply with an interest in whether permitting FDI as a ﬁrm structure
serves to beneﬁt world welfare or not.
Since many of our comparative statics hinge on the price level, we begin with the following
result.
Lemma 1. Denote variables with a star ∗ to represent the case without the option to become
a multinational. For all tariﬀ levels 𝑡? such that there are multinationals present when they
are an option, 𝑃 ∗
? < 𝑃?.
Proof. Suppose this is not the case, that is 𝑃 ∗
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therefore it must be the case that 𝐵∗
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∗
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But this contradicts condition (24).24 Therefore, 𝑃 ∗
? < 𝑃? for all 𝑡? such that multinationals
are present.
The next proposition follows from the results in Lemma 1 and compares several key
values across the two cases.
Proposition 3. Denote variables with a star ∗ to represent the case without the option to
become a multinational. The following inequalities hold for all tariﬀ levels 𝑡? such that there







































Proof. Proof by direct calculation.
Thus, holding tariﬀs constant, the entry of multinationals drives low productivity do-
mestic ﬁrms and low productivity exporters out of the market, lowers the aggregate price
index, and lowers total consumption of both domestically produced and imported varieties.
Since multinationals have lower prices than imported varieties for given tariﬀs, this is an
intuitive result. An additional implication of these diﬀerences is that the total mass of va-
rieties available to consumers in a given country falls when FDI is introduced since tariﬀ
24Recall that 1 < 𝜀 ⇒ 𝑡
1−𝜀
𝑘 < 1, where the presence of FDI implies that 𝑡𝑘 > 1.
24jumping varieties were available beforehand but some imported and domestically produced
varieties exit the market. National income also changes when FDI is permitted, although
the direction is ambiguous. Since both the average proﬁtability of exporting and domes-
tic sales fall and the mass of ﬁrms engaged in these activities declines when FDI occurs,
these sources of income fall with FDI. Further, the decline in the mass of exporters reduces
tariﬀ revenue, further reducing income. This is contrasted with the increase in proﬁts of
domestically-owned ﬁrms that switch from exporting to tariﬀ-jumping FDI. The net eﬀect
depends on the relative size of these changes brought about by changes in the cutoﬀs.
To compare these discrete changes requires additional assumptions on the functional
form of the ﬁxed cost mapping. Therefore we return to our illustrative example where
𝑓(?) = 𝜂?+𝜆. In this case, for all relevant values of 𝜀 where FDI occurs, income evaluated at
the Nash equilibrium when FDI is not permitted is higher than when holding the tariﬀ ﬁxed
at that level and allowing FDI to occur. Thus, the increase in proﬁts for ﬁrms becoming
multinationals is insuﬃcient to outweigh the losses in income from other sources. Indeed, the
combined loss in varieties and income implies that welfare is lower when FDI is permitted
but the tariﬀ is held constant. Figure 5 illustrates this. In Figure 5, the middle line is welfare
evaluated at the Nash equilibrium when FDI is not permitted. The bottom line is welfare
using that Nash tariﬀ but allowing ﬁrms to undertake FDI.25 Thus, at least for this speciﬁc
example, permitting FDI actually lowers welfare because it reduces the mass of varieties
available to consumers and lowers national income.
Despite this, it is important to remember that when FDI becomes an option one might
well expect tariﬀs to adjust. Therefore, we now consider how the Nash tariﬀs compare
between the cases when FDI is an option and when it is not. As with the above welfare
comparison, we are not analytically able to do so. Although the ﬁrst order condition (23)
remains the same in both cases in its overall form, it is evaluated at diﬀerent cutoﬀs for do-
mestic ﬁrms, exporters, and (obviously) multinationals. This makes comparisons untractable
25In Figure 5, for graphical clarity, we have exaggerated the diﬀerences between the welfare levels in a way
that preserves the ordinal ranking across regimes where welfare is itself an ordinal ranking.
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FDI permitted but tariff held at its no FDI
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Figure 5: Welfare Comparisons
without additional assumptions on the ﬁxed cost mapping. Despite this, allowing FDI cre-
ates two intuitive changes in the optimal tariﬀ decision. In this model, a country gains from
a tariﬀ in two ways: (1) tariﬀ revenue (spent on the numeraire) and (2) increased domestic
proﬁts. However, in the presence of multinationals both of these gains are dampened. In
response to a tariﬀ increase, the least eﬃcient foreign exporters drop out of the market and
the most eﬃcient exporters become multinationals. Both actions lower tariﬀ revenue. The
latter also lowers the gains to domestic proﬁts from protection. Thus, the beneﬁt of a given
tariﬀ falls. At the same time, however, the cost of the tariﬀ falls in the presence of FDI
because this lowers the tariﬀ-induced distortions to consumption of the heterogeneous good.
This is because a ﬁrm that tariﬀ-jumps continues to sell to domestic consumers and does so
at a lower price, yielding a positive eﬀect on the consumer’s utility. Note that this concerns
how the impact of changing the tariﬀ depends on whether FDI is an option and is therefore
a distinctly diﬀerent issue from the impact of making FDI an option but holding the tariﬀ
26constant (which was discussed above). Thus, from the demand side of the market, the cost
of implementing a tariﬀ is lower when FDI is present.
The net eﬀect of these changes on the desirability of a given tariﬀ is ambiguous. To get
additional insight, we again appeal to our illustrative example where 𝑓(?) = 𝜂?+𝜆.26 Figure
6 illustrates a country’s Nash tariﬀ both when FDI is present and when FDI is ruled out as
a function of the elasticity of substitution, 𝜀. As can be seen, allowing FDI as an entry mode
mitigates tariﬀ competition. Intuitively, this occurs because the option of tariﬀ jumping
increases the tariﬀ elasticity of export supply which on its own would reduce the chosen
tariﬀ. In addition, as discussed above, if the tariﬀ did not change but FDI occurs, there
is a loss of varieties. This can be somewhat undone by lowering the tariﬀ and encouraging
entry and production by foreign exporters. These two dominate the other eﬀects, resulting
in a lower tariﬀ. This is the same intuition provided for Figure 4. Note that this means
that allowing FDI pushes tariﬀs closer to those that would be chosen by the social planner
(where, ironically, FDI does not occur in equilibrium).
Blanchard (2006, 2007) have a similar ﬁnding, however the mode of FDI in these models
diﬀers from that presented here. In Blanchard (2007), domestic ﬁrms invest in the host
country for purposes of exporting back to the home country, which is a story of vertical
FDI. We however consider horizontal FDI, which according to the evidence of Blonigen,
Davies, and Head (2003) and Markusen and Maskus (2002) is the dominant form of FDI.
Larch (2008) ﬁnds a comparable result for horizontal FDI, although he assumes a ﬁxed
number of domestic ﬁrms. This is a critical assumption because, in our model, FDI results
in lost domestic varieties and lower proﬁts from domestic sales. This leads to lower welfare
when FDI is introduced and tariﬀs are held at their no-FDI Nash levels.27 Blanchard (2006)
assumes exogenous foreign equity holdings in both the export and import sector. This supply
side integration lowers the Nash tariﬀ because a tariﬀ now decreases the return to domestic
26The result that FDI lowers Nash tariﬀs has been conﬁrmed using other parameterizations of the ﬁxed
cost function, including constant elasticity functions for 𝑓(𝑖).
27This feature would likewise be missing from Ludema (2002) who has an exogenous number of ﬁrms.













Figure 6: Optimal Tariﬀ as a function of the elasticity of substitution
owners of equity in the foreign export sector. Moreover, there are less gains to domestic
producers since a portion is now owned by the foreign country. This latter eﬀect is present
in our model, but to a larger extent given that ﬁrms are allowed to tariﬀ-jump. In each case,
however, it is interesting to note that the rise of FDI has coincided with a general reduction
in tariﬀs (and a proliferation of trade agreements), a correlation matching that found in
reality. Thus, declines in barriers to FDI may have played a role in the movement towards
freer trade.
The ﬁnal issue is whether permitting FDI and then allowing an adjustment in tariﬀs raises
welfare. Figure 5 plots welfare in the Nash equilibrium with FDI (the top line) alongside
Nash welfare when FDI is not permitted (the middle line). As can be seen, Nash welfare
with FDI is strictly greater than Nash welfare without it. The reason for this is because
of an increase in the mass of varieties driven by the drop in the equilibrium tariﬀ. When
FDI is permitted and the tariﬀ adjusts, income falls due to the introduction of FDI for the
28same reasons as discussed in the above thought experiment. This is now exacerbated by the
decline in tariﬀs, which further erodes the proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms and tariﬀ revenues.28
This tariﬀ decline, however, has a second (and dominate) impact on the mass of varieties.
When FDI was introduced but tariﬀs were held constant, the availability of both foreign and
domestically owned varieties fell, resulting in an overall drop in welfare. Now, however, the
drop in the tariﬀ increases the availability of foreign owned varieties. Although this causes a
greater decline in the mass of domestically produced varieties, the net eﬀect is to increase the
total mass of varieties relative to the Nash equilibrium without FDI. This engenders a boost
to welfare which is suﬃcient to overwhelm the decline in income. Thus, the welfare gains that
come from FDI are driven by their ability to mitigate tariﬀ competition, bringing individual
countries’ and combined world welfare closer to the levels achievable by coordinated tariﬀ
setting.
6 Conclusion
The idea that a country can increase its welfare by charging a positive tariﬀ has been around
since Bickerdike (1906) and the idea of tariﬀ-jumping has been around since Bhagwati (1987).
Ellingsen and W¨ arneryd (1997) were the ﬁrst to marry these two concepts, but resulted in a
knife-edge case in which no FDI occurred in equilibrium. We provide a model that dulls this
knife-edge through the endogenous entry of heterogeneous ﬁrms. This provides an additional
insight into the relation between endogenous trade policy and productivity, a link that results
in socially optimal import subsidies. We ﬁnd that a country’s unilateral welfare maximizing
tariﬀ is greater than the one that maximizes world welfare. Thus the productivity loss
28It is worth noting that in our model, domestic producers prefer a higher tariﬀ that creates more FDI to
this lower tariﬀ with less FDI. This seems to be in contrast to Ellingsen and W¨ arneryd (1997) where domestic
ﬁrms prefer a higher tariﬀs but not so high as to encourage tariﬀ-jumping. The diﬀerence in this result is that
in our model, FDI and exporters co-exist as a result of ﬁrm heterogeneity. Thus the higher tariﬀ encourages
some FDI but suﬃciently retards exporters so that the net eﬀect beneﬁts domestic producers. Ellingsen and
W¨ arneryd, however, have homogeneous ﬁrms. Thus an increase in the tariﬀ that increases FDI does not
cause a marginal inﬂow of FDI, but a large, discrete increase in multinationals which reduces domestic ﬁrm
proﬁts. This further highlights the contribution of implementing a heterogeneous ﬁrm framework.
29resulting from tariﬀ competition highlights a new ineﬃciency of such competition. This
result persists regardless of whether or not FDI is an option for ﬁrms. Numerical examples
indicate that allowing ﬁrms to tariﬀ-jump dampens tariﬀ competition and improves Nash
equilibrium welfare of each country.
Like all models of heterogeneous ﬁrms, we have relied on a variety of assumptions that
simplify the model and provide tractability. Nevertheless, the intuitive nature of the results
is likely to hold up to many generalizations. Additional testing of the robustness of the model
to these assumptions is something we leave to future research. Future work could also incor-
porate features such as spillovers from FDI, multiple policy instruments (such as domestic
subsidies), or intertemporal issues (such as the structure of self-enforcing trade agreements)
into the model to yield additional insights. Therefore we hope that this framework provides
a useful springboard for examination of such issues in the context of ﬁrm heterogeneity.
30APPENDIX




















































































































































Using (A-4) - (A-6) and noting from the equilibrium condition (10) that 𝐵? − Γ𝑓(??𝑀) =
?𝑘
𝑡𝜀































31where 𝑠(?󺱘) is the propensity to consume the heterogeneous good. Quasilinear utility implies

































































Turning to country ?’s unilateral Nash tariﬀ, the ﬁrst order condition mirrors that of the
social planner except that it doesn’t take into account the impact on the welfare of country
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